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Abstract
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.
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Mauleon, A., Vannetelbosch, V., & Vergote, W. (2008). Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable setsin two-sided matching (CORE Discussion Papers 2008/16). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/250453