(2002) 16th Annual Congress of the European-Economic-Association — Location: LAUSANNE(Switzerland) (30.August.2001)
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Authors
Legros, P.
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Newman, AF
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Abstract
This paper shows that the possibility of interference in court proceedings, or more generally jamming other agents' messages, has significant consequences for the form of optimal contracts and the flexibility of decisions that can be made inside firms. Our approach offers a new view of authority, basing it on the ability of parties to have their say in court. Interference gives authority a role in worlds where it is traditionally absent in contract theory, like simple employment relationships without specific investments. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
Legros, P., & Newman, A. (2002). Courts, contracts, and interference. European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 734-744. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/41494 (Original work published 2002)