On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange

Ludovic, Julien
(2013) Research in Economics — Vol. 67, n° 1, p. 59-75 (2013)

Files

pdfdocument.pdf
  • Restricted Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 270.01 KB
No access

Details

Authors
  • Ludovic, JulienUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a strategic equilibrium concept which extends Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmark of strategic market games proposed by Sahi and Yao (1989), we define the notion of Stackelberg equilibrium. This concept captures strategic interactions in interrelated markets on which a finite number of leaders and followers compete on quantities. Within the framework of an example, convergence and welfare are studied. More specifically, we analyze convergence toward the competitive equilibrium and make welfare comparisons with other strategic equilibria. © 2012 University of Venice.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Ludovic, J. (2013). On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange. Research in Economics, 67(1), 59-75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2012.09.001 (Original work published 2013)