The function of Analogy in Law: Return to Kant and Wittgenstein

Lenoble, Jacques
(1991) Analogy in Law — ISBN: [0-00-000000-0], p. 107-144, published

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  • Lenoble, JacquesUCLouvain
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Abstract
From the very beginning, philosophical reflection on law has been confronted with questions of legal reasoning and of the relation between judge and rule. These questions entail indeed as Gadamer pointed out1 the issue of the role of Reason in human activity (moral, political and legal), and hence ultimately the issue of the statute of Reason. The same relatedness explains the present renewal of philosophy of law and of reflection on the legal judgment. At the same moment that the philosophical debate on Reason takes a new flight, we perceive the development of theoretical controversies on legal reasoning. This link is even that much more explicit because the same model underlies this double renewal.
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Lenoble, J. (1991). The function of Analogy in Law: Return to Kant and Wittgenstein. In P. NERHOT (ed.) (ed.), Analogy in Law (p. p. 107-144). D. Reidel. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/39638