Social insurance and redistribution
(2003) Alternatives for Welfare Policy — ISBN: [978-0-5218-1406-5], p. 238-254 (chap. 10), published
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- Abstract
- This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable particularly when there is a negative correlation between laborproductivity and loss probability.
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Pestieau, P. (2003). Social insurance and redistribution. In Andersen ,T.M. ; Molander, P. (ed.), Alternatives for Welfare Policy (p. p. 238-254 (chap. 10)). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493508.011