Valuing care protects religiosity from the antisocial consequences of impersonal deontology
(2016) Journal of Empirical Theology — Vol. 29, n° 2, p. 171-189 (2016)
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- Morality typically includes prosociality but often also extends to impersonal deontology. Religion, theoretically and empirically, is concerned with both moral domains. What happens when the two domains are in conflict? Do religious people prefer impersonal deontology at the detriment of prosociality? Or do their prosocial inclinations allow them to transgress conflicting moral principles, for instance through white lies? Participants (177 Belgian adults) made a choice in several hypothetical moral dilemmas and were afterwards evaluated on Haidt’s moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity) and religiosity. When the conflict implied minor consequences for the target, religiosity predicted impersonal deontology at the detriment of prosociality, because of a high endorsement of purity. However, when the consequences were severe, religiosity was unrelated to impersonal deontology due to a suppressor effect of care. The findings indicate that prosocial dispositions shape religiosity into a ‘compassionate moral rigorism’, thus protecting it from excessive moralism.
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Deak, C., & Saroglou, V. (2016). Valuing care protects religiosity from the antisocial consequences of impersonal deontology. Journal of Empirical Theology, 29(2), 171-189. https://doi.org/10.1163/15709256-12341339 (Original work published 2016)