Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills
(2005) Social Choice and Welfare — Vol. 24, n° 1, p. 93-127 (2005)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- We develop an approach which escapes Arrow’s impossibility by relying on information about agents’ indifference curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in skills, and equal access to resources for all preferences.
- Affiliations
University Paris CNRS
Citations
Fleurbaey, M., & Maniquet, F. (2005). Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills. Social Choice and Welfare, 24(1), 93-127. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0294-y (Original work published 2005)