The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public projects

Bogomolnaia, Anna;Le Breton, Michel;Savvateev, Alexei;Weber, Shlomo
(2005)

Files

dp2005_24.pdf
  • Open Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 135.7 KB
Download

Details

Authors
  • Bogomolnaia, Anna
    Author
  • Le Breton, Michel
    Author
  • Savvateev, Alexei
    Author
  • Weber, ShlomoUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Bogomolnaia, A., Le Breton, M., Savvateev, A., & Weber, S. (2005). The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public projects (CORE Discussion Papers 2005/24). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/33061