The political economy of derived pension rights
(2012) International Tax and Public Finance — Vol. 19, n° 5, p. 753-776 (2012)
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- Abstract
- Derived pension rights (including survivor benefits and spousal compensations for one-earner couples) exist in most Social Security systems but with variable generosity. They are mainly viewed as a means to alleviate poverty among older women living alone. The purpose of this paper is to explain how they can emerge from a political economy process when Social Security is a combination of Bismarckian and Beveridgean pillars.We find that the pension system should be contributive but with a positive level of derived rights. We also show that such a system encourages stay-at-home wives, thus revealing an unpleasant trade-off between female labor participation and poverty alleviation.
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Citations
Leroux, M.-L., & Pestieau, P. (2012). The political economy of derived pension rights. International Tax and Public Finance, 19(5), 753-776. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-011-9205-9 (Original work published 2012)