Foundations of Cities

Thisse, Jacques-François;Turner, Matthew A.;Ushchev, Philip
(2024) , 62 pages

Files

CORE_DP_2024-16.pdf
  • Open Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 1.16 MB
Download

Details

Authors
  • Thisse, Jacques-FrançoisUCLouvain
    Author
  • Turner, Matthew A.Brown University
    Author
  • Ushchev, PhilipULB
    Author
Abstract
Howdopeoplechooseworkandresidencelocationswhencommutingiscostly and productivity spillovers, increasing returns to scale, or first nature advantage, reward the concentration of employment. We describe such an equilibrium city in a simple geography populated by agents with heterogenous preferences over workplace-residence pairs. The behavior of equilibrium cities is more complex than previously understood. Heterogeneous location preferences are sufficient for equilibrium centralization of employment and residence. Increasing returns and productivity spillovers can disperse employment. An increase in commuting costs may decentralize residence and employment. Our results shed new light on classical urban economics and are important for our understanding of quantitative spatial models.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Thisse, J.-F., Turner, M. A., & Ushchev, P. (2024). Foundations of Cities (LIDAM Discussion Paper CORE 2024/16). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/215467