On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy-Proofness Properties

Le breton, Michel;Zaporozhets, Vera
(2006)

Files

equivalence.pdf
  • Open Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 222.94 KB
Download

Details

Authors
  • Le breton, MichelUniversité de Toulouse 1
    Author
  • Zaporozhets, VeraUniversité de Toulouse 1
    Author
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a su¢ cient condition on the domain of admissible preferences of a social choice mechanism under which the properties of individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of this general result in the case where a Öxed budget has to be allocated among several pure public goods.
Affiliations
  • Université de Toulouse 1Gremaq
  • Université de Toulouse 1Gremaq

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Le breton, M., & Zaporozhets, V. (2006). On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy-Proofness Properties (IDEI Working Paper 408). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/249562