Essays on development economics : institutions and technology adoption
(2011)
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- Authors
- Supervisors
- Boucekkine, Raouf
- Abstract
- (en) This dissertation collects four essays on the development economics. Three of them are related to the link between institutions, taken as endogenous, and economic growth while one essay is devoted to technology adoption problem under the subsistence farming. Second and third chapter are modeling the occurrence of institutional change within a developing economy with failure institutions and assess its impact on growth. We consider the institutionalized corruption as the cause of the weakness of institutions. Individuals may put together their efforts, through an active civil society, in order to fight against corruption. Civil society is taken as a channel for institutional change. In brief, Chapter 2 and 3 borrow the technical tools of dynamic game theory to analyze how government and consumers interact in this institutional game. Chapter 4 analyzes the technology adoption problem in the subsistence farming. It deals with subsistence consumption as an important barrier to adoption even if learning costs and other impediments to adoption are neglected. Finally, Chapter 5 comes back to institutions by testing how codified contracts rules in economically important contracts influence the economic performance. In particular we test the impact of codified default rules in the contracts on economic performance. The main assumption is that codified default rules create a favorable environment for doing business since the conclusion of enforceable contracts is facilitated and involves fewer costs for economic agents.
- Affiliations
Citations
Ngendakuriyo, F. (2011). Essays on development economics : institutions and technology adoption. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/208785