Oligopolistic pricing of piratable information goods
(2003)
Files
WP83Belleflamme.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 325.8 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizontally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We study the effects of the resulting strategic interaction by comparing the optimal choices of a multiproduct monopolist controlling all n information goods with the Nash equilibria of the pricing game played by n oligopolists.
- Affiliations
Citations
Belleflamme, P. (2003). Oligopolistic pricing of piratable information goods (ECON Discussion Papers 2003/87). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/129984