Upstream market foreclosure

Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean;Zanaj, Skerdilajda
(2008) Bulletin of Economic Research — Vol. 60, n° 1, p. 13-26 (2008)

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  • Jaskold Gabszewicz, JeanUCLouvain
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  • Zanaj, SkerdilajdaUCLouvain
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Abstract
This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyze two polar cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being supplied inelastically. We show that this situation opens the door to entry deterrence. Then, we assume that the input is supplied by a single seller who chooses the input price. In this case, we show that entry deterrence can be reached only through merger with the seller of the input.
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Jaskold Gabszewicz, J., & Zanaj, S. (2008). Upstream market foreclosure. Bulletin of Economic Research, 60(1), 13-26. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/250372 (Original work published 2008)