This paper contributes to the debate on the virtues and vices of counterfactuals as a basis for causal inference. The goal is to put the counterfactual approach in an epistemological perspective. We discuss a number of issues, ranging from its non-observable basis to the parallelisms drawn between the counterfactual approach in statistics and in philosophy. We argue that the question is not to oppose or to endorse the counterfactual approach as a matter of principle, but to decide what modelling framework is best to adopt depending on the research context.
University of Kent CanterburyDepartment of Philosophy
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Russo, F., Wunsch, G., & Mouchart, M. (2011). Inferring causality through counterfactuals in observational studies - Some epistemological issues. Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique, 111, 43-64. https://doi.org/10.1177/0759106311408891 (Original work published 2011)