Are Bicameral Firms Preferable to Codetermination or Worker Cooperatives?

Ferretti, Thomas;Gosseries, Axel;et.al.
(2024) Democratizing the Corporation: The Bicameral Firm and Beyond — ISBN: [978-1804294536], p. 165-179, published

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Abstract
Is economic bicameralism better at achieving them than alternatives such as codetermination or worker cooperatives? Section 1 introduces our normative framework. We stress that a mere parallel between states and firms cannot suffice to justify workplace democracy. Adequate justification requires that costs in terms of negative freedom restrictions and eventual loss of economic productivity be outweighed by the benefits of democratization. Section 2 compares the relative capacity of bicameralism and alternatives to deliver the expected benefits of firm-level economic democratization. Those benefits are assessed in terms of (a) reducing domination and bargaining power inequalities, (b) improving deliberation, and (c) unlocking epistemic benefits. We argue that bicameralism is weak on the first two fronts. Section 3 investigates the economic costs of bicameral firms. Including two classes of patrons in decision-making— investors and workers in decision-making may lead to higher costs of contracting capital, higher costs of decision-making, and higher agency costs than alternatives.
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Ferretti, T., Gosseries, A., & et al. (2024). Are Bicameral Firms Preferable to Codetermination or Worker Cooperatives? In Ferreras (I.), Malleson (T.), and Rogers (J.) (dir. (ed.), Democratizing the Corporation: The Bicameral Firm and Beyond (p. p. 165-179). Verso. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/242387