Around 1800, many important figures of post-Kantianism advocated a radical shift in the meta-philosophical conception of rational thought. Although inspired by the Kantian revolution, thinkers such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, but also Reinhold and Jacobi, sought to move from a reflection on the conditions of the possibility of knowledge to an account of the actual existence and development of rationality. In this context, dialectical thinking was revived by some of these thinkers as a way of grasping the movement that shapes the inner structure of truth.Reinhold´s departure from transcendental philosophy and his turn to "realism" inspired by Bardili´s logic is a vivid example of such a quest. In his "Beiträge zur leichter Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange des 19. Jahrhundert", he sought to grasp the reality of cognition by defining dialectic in a Platonic-inspired sense, that is, as a movement of ascent from the hypothetical and problematic principles to the fundamental arch-truth [Urwahre] of thought. At the same time, Hegel´s early elaborations in Jena were also part of the attempt to comprehend the intrinsic dynamics of the Absolute. The text known as the Differenzschrift, which was aimed precisely at a confrontation with Reinhold´s Beiträge, illustrates the intention to conceive the different positions of speculative philosophy as part of the unfolding of reason in oppositions and antinomies. Although he did not yet explicitly use the term "dialectic" to define his method, Hegel´s definition of the Absolute as "the identity of identity and non-identity" (G.W. 4, p. 64) already announced the dialectical conception of thought that he would later fully develop in the mature system.In this paper, I propose to read the controversy between Reinhold and Hegel around 1800 as a dispute over the dialectical structure of philosophical thought. Some recent interpretations have emphasized the underlying affinities between Reinhold and Hegel and their shared intention to advance a material conception of truth. The aim of this talk is to challenge this reading by arguing that Reinhold and Hegel represent two different ways of understanding dialectic, and thus two fundamentally different responses to the problem of the reality of reason.The plan of my paper is as follows. First, I will examine how Reinhold, after his conversion to realism, resorts to dialectic in order to criticize the foundationalist perspective of transcendental philosophy, which includes his own previous philosophical position. Second, I will outline Hegel´s critique of Reinhold in the Differenzschrift as a plea for the introduction of negativity into the self-movement of reason. Third, and finally, I will argue that the disagreement between Reinhold and Hegel results in two different ways of understanding dialectic, a divergence that remains operative in contemporary philosophical trends.
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KU Leuven
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Tangorra, M. (2025). Reinhold and Hegel on the Dialectic of Philosophical Thought. 21st Conference of the International Network of Transcendental Philosophy and German Idealism, Barcelona. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/239712