The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights commits the States parties to »take steps ... to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant ...«. While this »progressive realization« clause is typically seen as a weakness it can also be turned into a strength: with this provision, the way States mobilize resources and how they define their spending priorities become human rights issues, allowing human rights bodies to scrutinize public budgets. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has sought to clarify the content of the duty to devote the »maximum available resources« to the progressive realization of the Covenant rights by setting forth four »constitutional background norms«: the duty of non-retrogression, the priority to be given to the fulfillment of core obligations, and the requirements of non-discrimination and of participation. These norms remain insufficient, however, as tools to examine States’ compliance. Instead, the conceptual framework to guide States should allow to consider resource mobilization jointly with spending, and to relate both to outcomes. Addressing budgetary choices against the requirements of the Covenant means turning to the background causes of the lack of realization of rights by examining the macroeconomic choices, the fiscal policies, or the considerations that guide the public budget. And it means considering how tax policies are set and how budgetary choices are made. The substantive norms that should guide budgetary choices should be combined with strong procedural requirements: it is by strengthening democratic decision-making in budgetary choices that we can overcome the tension between the external supervision of such choices, and democratic self-determination.
De Schutter, O. (2018). The rights-based welfare state : Public budgets and economic and social rights. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/118573