Market competition and strike activity
(2003) International Journal of Industrial Organization — Vol. 21, n° 5, p. 737-758 (2003)
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- Abstract
- We develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly. We investigate how product differentiation and market competition (Bertrand vs. Cournot competition) affect wages and strikes. If bargaining takes place at the industry-level, then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of product differentiation whatever the type of market competition. However, if bargaining takes place at the firm-level, then wages and strikes are increasing with the degree of product differentiation, and the strike activity is smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.
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Citations
Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2003). Market competition and strike activity. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(5), 737-758. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00092-9 (Original work published 2003)