Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals

Forges, F.
(1982) International Journal of Game Theory — Vol. 11, n° 3-4, p. 203-213 (1982)

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  • Forges, F.UCLouvain
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Abstract
The author considers infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum games of incomplete information in which the signals are the same for both players and consist of probability distributions on a given alphabet. He shows that such games have a value.
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Forges, F. (1982). Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals. International Journal of Game Theory, 11(3-4), 203-213. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01755730 (Original work published 1982)