From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions
(2015) The Review of Economic Studies — Vol. 82, n° 2, p. 565-607 (2015)
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- Abstract
- Marriage institutions have changed over time, evolving from polygyny to monogamy, and then to serial monogamy (as defined by divorce and remarriage). We propose a unified theory of such institutional changes, where the dynamics of income distribution are the driving force. We characterize the marriage-market equilibrium in each of the three alternative regimes, and determine which one emerges as a political equilibrium, depending on the state of the economy. In a two-class society, a rise in the share of rich males drives the change from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in the proportion of either rich females or rich males. Monogamy eases the transition to serial monogamy, since it promotes social mobility.
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De la Croix, D., & Mariani, F. (2015). From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(2), 565-607. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv001 (Original work published 2015)