Fair social orderings

Fleurbaey, Marc;Maniquet, François
(2008) Economic Theory — Vol. 34, n° 1, p. 25-45 (2008)

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In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.
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Fleurbaey, M., & Maniquet, F. (2008). Fair social orderings. Economic Theory, 34(1), 25-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4 (Original work published 2008)