Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
(2009) Journal of Economics — Vol. 97, n° 2, p. 141-163 (2009)
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- Abstract
- This paper addresses two questions concerning Joint Venture (JV)agreements. We first study the formation and the performance of a JV when the partners’contribution has a different impact on the JV profits. Then, we check whether the JV is more likely as well as the welfare level improves when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is delegated to an independent JV management (Management sharing) rather than jointly taken by partners (Coordinated sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV’s profits should have a larger profit share. Moreover, at least in some cases, Management sharing increases both welfare and the probability that the JV is formed.
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Marinucci, M. (2009). Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners. Journal of Economics, 97(2), 141-163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0066-y (Original work published 2009)