Stochastic games

Mertens, Jean-François
(2002) Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 3 — ISBN: [978-0444894281], p. 1810-1832, published

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  • Mertens, Jean-FrançoisUCLouvain
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Abstract
Stochastic games model repeated play with symmetric information. We analyze their value in the zero-sum case, and approach the study of their equilibria in the non-zero-sum case.
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Mertens, J.-F. (2002). Stochastic games. In R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 3 (p. p. 1810-1832). Elsevier Science. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/250737