The aim of this paper is to grasp the very object of so-called philosophy of action, namely human action. It purports to explore what it is that philosophers of action are interested in when they talk about ‘action’ in a restricted sense. To do so I rely on Elizabeth Anscombe’s way of addressing the issue. Drawing from her monography on intention and from various later writings, I reject the possibility of conceiving of human action as some kind of sub-class of events and thus the possibility of providing an extensional account of ‘human action’. Rather, I explore its relation to the voluntary and the intentional, to the kind of agent performing such actions and to morality.
Aucouturier, V. (2022). Human Action. In Adrian Haddock, Rachael Wiseman (ed.) (ed.), The Anscombean Mind. Routledge. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/228955