Bayesian implementation, efficiency, and independence classes

d'Aspremont-Lynden, Claude;Crémer, Jacques
(2025) , 47 pages

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  • d'Aspremont-Lynden, ClaudeUCLouvain
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  • Crémer, JacquesToulouse School of Economics
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Abstract
The theory of Bayesian mechanism design is of interest to economists andcomputer scientists alike. It has focused on two extreme assumptions on the beliefs of the agents, full-freeness (or independence) and no-freeness (or Beliefs Determine Preferences). We discuss more general conditions that cover intermediate cases between these two extremes and characterize the corresponding set of implementable mechanisms. We also discuss applications of these results to economics and to computer science.
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d’Aspremont-Lynden, C., & Crémer, J. (2025). Bayesian implementation, efficiency, and independence classes (LIDAM Discussion Paper CORE 2025/02). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/239716