Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets

Belleflamme, Paul;Toulemonde, Eric
(2007)

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Abstract
Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra-group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter-group externalities.
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Citations

Belleflamme, P., & Toulemonde, E. (2007). Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets (CORE Discussion Papers 2007/39). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/42201