Efficient intrusion-resilient signatures without random oracles
(2006) Information Security and Cryptology. Second SKLOIS Conference, Inscrypt 2006. Proceedings — Location: Beijing, China (29.November.2006)
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- Abstract
- Intrusion-resilient signatures are key-evolving protocols that extend the concepts of forward-secure and key-insulated signatures. As in the latter schemes, time is divided into distinct periods where private keys are periodically updated while public keys remain fixed. Private keys are stored in both a user and a base; signature operations are performed by the user while the base is involved in periodic updates. Such a system remains secure after arbitrarily many compromises of both modules as long as break-ins are not simultaneous. Besides, when they simultaneously occur within some time period, past periods remain safe. In this work, we propose the first intrusion-resilient signature in the standard model (i,e. without random oracles) which provides both short signatures and at most log-squared private storage in the number of time periods.
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Libert, B., Quisquater, J.-J., & Yung, M. (2006). Efficient intrusion-resilient signatures without random oracles. In Lipmaa, H.; Yung, M.; Lin, D.; (ed.), Information Security and Cryptology. Second SKLOIS Conference, Inscrypt2006. Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 4318) (p. p. 27-41). Springer-verlag. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/229770