From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions
(2012)
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- Abstract
- Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy.
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Citations
De la Croix, D., & Mariani, F. (2012). From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions (CORE Discussion Paper 2012/18). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/208411