Familial Control, Size and Performance in the Largest French Firms
(1977) , 18 pages
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- Authors
- Abstract
- (en) Contrasting with the traditional profit-maximizing economic theory of the firm, where managerial discretion is unimportant, there is a growing body of U.S. economic studies suggesting first, that the large corporation is characterized by a wide dispersion of stock ownership implying a separation of ownership and control; secondly, that the shift in control from owners to managers leads to a firm's policies and performance conflicting with stockholders interests.
- Affiliations
Citations
Jacquemin, A., & de Ghellinck, E. (1977). Familial Control, Size and Performance in the Largest French Firms (Working Papers Institut des sciences économiques 7709). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/278730