The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects

Forges, Françoise;Mertens, Jean-François;Vohra, Rajiv
(2001)

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Authors
  • Forges, Françoise
    Author
  • Mertens, Jean-FrançoisUCLouvain
    Author
  • Vohra, Rajiv
    Author
Abstract
In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.
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Citations

Forges, F., Mertens, J.-F., & Vohra, R. (2001). The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects (CORE Discussion Papers 2001/1). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/128241