Contribution to collective choice theory
(2010)
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- (en) Individuals as economic agents are rarely in state to make decision in perfect isolation. Markets, social norms, institutions, clubs, alliances, social networks are instances of collective influence on the agents choices. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse how groups form and are organized in coalitions and/or networks to conduct social, economic and political activities. This thesis contains five essays on the economics of coalitions and networks, using axiomatic and cooperative game theoretical approaches. The first essay presents an index to evaluate the difficulty political parties have to reach a decision in a parliament. United we stand or unity is strength are two different ways to state that joining forces is better. In economics also there exist several formulations. It is the purpose of the second essay to distinguish and compare these formulations. The third essay develops tools to analyse productive networks of agents from a cooperative point of view. The last two essays develop a new framework in which agents can cooperate in terms of coalitions and networks. The fourth essay is devoted to the analysis of the stability of such structures and the last one proposes a way to allocate the fruit of collaboration under such structures.
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Caulier, J.-F. (2010). Contribution to collective choice theory. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/79233