Multi-period multi-product regulatory schemes for electricity distributors are presented, based on cost information from a productivity analysis model and an agency theoretical decision model. The proposed schemes are operational and demonstrate considerable advantages compared to the popular CPI-X revenue cap regulation. The schemes avoid arbitrariness, excessively high or negative informational rents as well as ratchet effects and they promote rapid productivity catch-up by making full use of available data. More generally, the paper contributes to the theoretical unification between firm-based Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) productivity models and micro-economic reimbursement theories.
Affiliations
Louvain School of ManagementOperations and Information
Citations
APA
Chicago
FWB
Agrell, P. J., Bogetoft, P., & Tind, J. (2005). DEA and dynamic yardstick competition in Scandinavian electricity distribution. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 23, 173-201. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-005-1327-6 (Original work published 2005)