The pareto principle of optimal inequality

Bommier, Antoine;Zuber, Stéphane
(2012) International Economic Review — Vol. 53, n° 2, p. 593-608 (2012)

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  • Bommier, Antoine
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  • Zuber, Stéphane
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Abstract
The Pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value judgments. In particular, it is generally thought that it can accommodate different degrees of inequality aversion. We show that this is generally not true in time-consistent intertemporal models where some uncertainty prevails. © (2012) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bommier, A., & Zuber, S. (2012). The pareto principle of optimal inequality. International Economic Review, 53(2), 593-608. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00693.x (Original work published 2012)