Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality : the case of environmental quality
(2000) Economica — Vol. Vol. 67, n° 268, p. 465-475 (2000)
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- Abstract
- This paper develops an intertemporal model wherein production generates pollution, which is viewed by consumers as a public bad. There are two types of consumer: those who are altruistic and leave bequests to their children, and those who are pure life-cyclers. Both types voluntarily contribute to the quality of environment through environmental groups; It appears that, if bequests by altruists and voluntary contributions by all are positive, redistribution is neutral-which does not mean that pollution abatement and capital accumulation are optimal. To achieve optimality, one needs a tax on inheritance and a differential subsidy on all consumer contributions.
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Jouvet, P.-A., Michel, P., & Pestieau, P. (2000). Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality : the case of environmental quality. Economica, Vol. 67(268), 465-475. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00220 (Original work published 2000)