Agenda control in coalition formation

Bloch, Francis;Rottier, Stéphane
(1999)

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  • Bloch, Francis
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  • Rottier, Stéphane
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Abstract
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.
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Bloch, F., & Rottier, S. (1999). Agenda control in coalition formation (CORE Discussion Papers 1999/67). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/128172