Exchange and optimality

Ghosal, S;Polemarchakis, HM.
(1999) Economic Theory — Vol. 13, n° 3, p. 629-642 (1999)

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Authors
  • Ghosal, S
    Author
  • Polemarchakis, HM.
    Author
Abstract
A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any nontrivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D60, D62.
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Ghosal, S., & Polemarchakis, HM. (1999). Exchange and optimality. Economic Theory, 13(3), 629-642. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050273 (Original work published 1999)