A bargaining set for roommate problems
(2019) , 16 pages
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- Abstract
- Since stable matchings may not exist, we adopt a weaker notion of stability for solving the roommate problem: the bargaining set. Klijn and Massó (2003) show that the bargaining set coincides with the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings in the marriage problem. First, we show that a weakly stable matching always exists in the roommate problem. However, weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. Second, we prove that the bargaining set is always non-empty. Finally, as Klijn and Massó (2003) get for the marriage problem, we show that the bargaining set coincides with the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings in the roommate problem.
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Citations
Atay, A., Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2019). A bargaining set for roommate problems (CORE Discussion Papers 2019/12). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/269113