Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types

Forges, F.
(1986) International Journal of Game Theory — Vol. 15, n° 2, p. 65-82 (1986)

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  • Forges, F.UCLouvain
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Abstract
Games with lack of information on one side are considered where the uncertainty of the uniformed player concerns the (verifiable) identity of his opponent. Two solution concepts are compared: the correlated equilibrium and the noisy channel equilibrium. The analysis shows in particular that correlated equilibria behave differently in the model with verifiable types and in the one with unverifiable types.
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Forges, F. (1986). Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types. International Journal of Game Theory, 15(2), 65-82. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770976 (Original work published 1986)