The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements
(2010) Climate Policy — Vol. 10, n° 2, p. 148-166 (2010)
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- Authors
van Ypersele de Strihou, Jean-Pascal 
- Abstract
- The negotiation strategy of the European Union was analysed with respect to the formation of an international climate agreement of the post-2012 area. Game theory was employed to explore the incentives for key players in the climate policy arena to join future climate agreements. A - 20% unilateral commitment strategy by the EU was compared with a multilateral - 30% emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we fond that leakage, in the sense of strategic policy reactions on emissions, was negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared with 1990 levels) by 2020, if other Annex-B countries follow suit, does not induce the participation of the USA with a comparable reduction commitment. However, we argue that the original EU proposal can be reshaped so as to stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.
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Citations
Bréchet, T., Eyckmans, J., Gerard, Fr., Marbaix, P., Tulkens, H., & van Ypersele de Strihou, J.-P. (2010). The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements. Climate Policy, 10(2), 148-166. https://doi.org/10.3763/cpol.2009.0643 (Original work published 2010)