Securing micro-controllers against side-channel attacks : evaluation tools and applications
(2024)
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Details
- Authors
- Supervisors
- Standaert, François-Xavier
- Abstract
- Microcontrollers units (MCUs) are nowadays widespread thanks to their versatility and low cost. On one hand, they are ideal candidates for IoT products. On the other, they are the typical target of side-channel attacks. Such attacks exploit unwanted indirect leakages of cryptographic algorithm’s implementations. In this thesis, we study the side-channel security of MCUs where in the first part, we contribute to the evaluation methods by providing rules of thumb to design good measurement setups and an efficient method to analyze long traces and large states, which are common when analyzing software leakages. In the second part, we explore different methods and countermeasures that can be used to secure MCUs against side-channels. We first show that relying on coprocessors is not enough. Then, we show an attack against a 32-bit implementation of ISAP, a leakage-resilient PRF and analyze possible countermeasures to counter our attack. We end this thesis by providing a method for noise generation on MCUs by repurposing already present coprocessors.
- Affiliations
Citations
Udvarhelyi, B. (2024). Securing micro-controllers against side-channel attacks : evaluation tools and applications. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/31732