In this paper we investigate how, next to traditional economic factors, governance and political arguments may contribute to the determination of the corporate income tax rates. Therefore we .rst extend a standard model of tax competition in order to introduce those new arguments; we nest that model in the theory of lobbying. Then we propose an empiri-cal test of that extension using two international data sets and we show that good governance reduces the rates; parliamentary system, especially plurality election, and religious or nationalist executives, push rates up-ward. Regarding traditional economic factors, economic openness has a negative effect on rates and market size has a positive one; though not robust, interaction among neighbors plays a role. JEL: H73, H70. Keywords: Taxation and political institutions, tax competition, lobbying, governance.
Affiliations
Louvain School of ManagementAccounting & Finance
FUCaMSciences de gestion
Roral Military Academy and FUCaMEconomics
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Chicago
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Gérard, M., & Ruiz, F. (2010). Corporate taxation and the impact of governance, political and economic factors. Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, University of Uppsala, Sweden. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/250392