Quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly
(2002) Economics Letters — Vol. 77, n° 1, p. 65-72 (2002)
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- In the Mussa and Rosen model [J Econ Theory 18 (1978) 301] of vertical differentiation, a monopolist may optimally choose to underprovide quality if consumers are allowed to buy several units of the indivisible good, even if quality provision involves no cost of any sort. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Jaskold Gabszewicz, J., & Wauthy, X. (2002). Quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly. Economics Letters, 77(1), 65-72. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/52395 (Original work published 2002)