Wage competition with heterogeneous workers and firms
(2000) Journal of Labor Economics — Vol. 18, n° 3, p. 453-472 (2000)
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Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- We study imperfect competition in the labor market when both workers and firms are heterogeneous. When firms cannot observe workers’ skill, firms pay workers equal wages, but workers absorb training costs. When firms can identify worker types, firms pay different net wages to different workers. Voters select the level of general education that is financed by a lump-sum tax. Workers are on average better off when firms can observe workers’ skill for a given level of general human capital, but the median voter prefers a higher level of general human capital when firms cannot observe worker types
- Affiliations
University of Florida Department of Economics Stockholm University Department of Economics
Citations
Hamilton, J., Zenou, Y., & Thisse, J.-F. (2000). Wage competition with heterogeneous workers and firms. Journal of Labor Economics, 18(3), 453-472. https://doi.org/10.1086/209966 (Original work published 2000)