Anderson, Christa M.Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources, Stanford University, 473 Via Ortega, Y2E2 Building, Suite 226, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
Author
Asner, Gregory P.Department of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution for Science, 260 Panama St, Stanford, CA 94305, US
A variety of policy interventions from public authorities and private companies attempt to reduce deforestationin private forest concessions. These includefines for illegal deforestation and market incentives for forestmanagement practices that meet sustainability standards. While some studies have found significant differencesin forest outcomes between concessions that participate in sustainability commitments and those that do not,others have found small or inconclusive differences. We contribute to this literature by examining all privatelyallocated concessions in the Peruvian Amazon to determine whether sustainability commitments correspondwith lower deforestation rates. Conversely, we examine whetherfines correspond with higher deforestationrates, a question for which fewer analyses have been published. Using matching methods, we do notfind sig-nificantly different deforestation rates between control groups and logging concessions with third party en-vironmental certification. We also do not see significant differences in deforestation rates in petroleum con-cessions managed by companies who have made sustainability commitments. Regarding punitivefines, we donotfind significant differences in deforestation rates between control groups and logging concessions withfineslevied. The same holds true forfines levied in brazil nut concessions. Potential explanations for thesefindingsinclude insufficient monitoring or inadequate stringency for sustainability commitments, and insufficientlypunitivefines or low enforcement levels.
Anderson, C. M., Asner, G. P., & Lambin, E. (2019). Lack of association between deforestation and either sustainability commitments or fines in private concessions in the Peruvian Amazon. Forest Policy and Economics, 104, 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2019.03.010 (Original work published 2019)