Bargaining over public goods
(2009) Journal of Public Economic Theory — Vol. 11, n° 6, p. 927-945 (2009)
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- Authors
Davila Muro, Julio 
- Abstract
- In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
- Affiliations
University of Pennsylvania Department of Economics Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico Centro de Investigacion Economica
Citations
Davila Muro, J., Eeckhout, J., & Martinelli, C. (2009). Bargaining over public goods. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(6), 927-945. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01438.x (Original work published 2009)