Standardization and the stability of collusion

Lambertini, L;Poddar, S;Sasaki, D
(1998) Economics Letters — Vol. 58, n° 3, p. 303-310 (1998)

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Authors
  • Lambertini, L
    Author
  • Poddar, S
    Author
  • Sasaki, D
    Author
Abstract
We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a nonmonotone relationship between firms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
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Lambertini, L., Poddar, S., & Sasaki, D. (1998). Standardization and the stability of collusion. Economics Letters, 58(3), 303-310. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00010-X (Original work published 1998)