On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study
(2010) Social Choice and Welfare — Vol. 34, n° 1, p. 145-179 (2010)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating conflicting claims: the constrained equal awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal losses rules.We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of these three rules. In addition, we let subjects play an additional game that has the property that all (and only) strategy profiles in which players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium.While in the first three games subjects’ play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device, especially when we frame the game as an hypothetical bankruptcy situation. We also administered a questionnaire to a different group of students, asking them to act as impartial arbitrators to solve (among others) the same problems played in the lab. Also in this case, respondents were sensitive to the framing of the questions, but the proportional rule was selected by the vast majority of respondents.
- Affiliations
Universidad de Alicante Departament ode Fundamentos del Analisis Economico Universidad de Malaga Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica Universidad de Alicante Departamento de Fundamentos del Analisis Economico
Citations
Herrero, C., moreno ternero, j., & Ponti, G. (2010). On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(1), 145-179. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0398-0 (Original work published 2010)