The current development of cognitivist sciences borrowed to phenomenology the notion of intentionality; with some adjustments, it allows formalizing what is meant by “intelligent behavior” and, therefore, it gives a formal model against which it is possible to determine whether an automaton or an expert computer behaves with intelligence. The idea of such a borrowing comes from Searle. “As the conditions of satisfaction are interior to the act of speaking, the satisfaction conditions of the intentional state are interior to the intentional state”. In a comment to this quotation, Dreyfus says that “in the light of this theory of intentionality, the phenomenological reduction takes the central importance attributed to it by Husserl.
Maesschalck, M., & Kokoszka, V. (2006). Phenomenology and self-organisation. In B. Feltz and P. Goujon (éds.) (ed.), Self-Organization and Emergence in Life Sciences (p. p. 283-297). Springer. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/157379