The best means to an end: Influence of ingroup’s negotiation goals on representative selection
(2011) EASP 16th General meeting — Location: Stockholm (12.July.2011)
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- Abstract
- Intergroup negotiations frequently take place by means of representatives. In spite of the key role of group representatives in negotiations, surprisingly little is known on the process that guides their selection. In the present paper we examine the extent to which the selection of a representative depends on the goals pursued by the group. According to Scheepers and colleagues (2006), instrumental goals refer to the maximization of profit whereas identity goals are associated with the attainment of a positive social identity. In two experiments, we show that when negotiations are purely instrumental individuals prefer pro-outgroup deviants as representatives (Experiments 1 and 2). In contrast, when negotiations are identity-related, group members increase their preference for normative (Experiments 1 and 2) and pro-ingroup deviants (Experiment 1). Furthermore, these goals also impact perceptions of group members’ typicality. Taken together, these results point to the strategic acceptance of deviance when one’s goal is to bring the other party to concede and an increase of preference for normativity when identity is the group’s main preoccupation. We discuss implications of these results for research on negotiations and stress the importance of intergroup contexts on intragroup dynamics.
Citations
Pinto Teixeira, C. N., & et al. (2011). The best means to an end: Influence of ingroup’s negotiation goals on representative selection. EASP 16th General meeting, Stockholm. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/162064